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Abstract— This paper describes the methodology that was 
developed to allocate reliability and maintainability 
requirements for the NASA Ground Systems Development and 
Operations (GSDO) program’s subsystems. As systems 
progressed through their design life cycle and hardware data 
became available, it became necessary to reexamine the 
previously derived allocations. Allocating is an iterative process; 
as systems moved beyond their conceptual and preliminary 
design phases this provided an opportunity for the reliability 
engineering team to reevaluate allocations based on updated 
designs and maintainability characteristics of the components. 
Trade-offs in reliability and maintainability were essential to 
ensuring the integrity of the reliability and maintainability 
analysis. This paper will discuss the value of modifying 
reliability and maintainability allocations made for the GSDO 
subsystems as the program nears the end of its design phase.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Subsystems under NASA’s Ground Systems and 
Development and Operations (GSDO) program located at the 
Kennedy Space Center (KSC) have evolved to support future 
space programs, serving both NASA’s design reference 
missions for the Space Launch System (SLS) and commercial 
opportunities. GSDO requires a safe, reliable, maintainable, 
and available complex system of subsystems to successfully 
support launch activities.  In order to achieve this, a launch 
availability requirement must be established and decomposed 
to reliability and maintainability requirements that are then 
allocated to each subsystem based on their complexity and 
contribution to each launch attempt. The reliability, 
maintainability, and availability (RMA) analysis for each 
subsystem verifies these requirements. Reliability allocations 
are determined by GSDO program goals, predicted 
performance from previous programs, and historical 
performance of legacy subsystems and components. The 
reliability engineer must also consider the maintainability 
characteristics of each subsystems and its components to 
determine what, if any, trade-offs are needed between 
reliability and maintainability to reach the availability 
requirement. The mean corrective maintenance time or mean 
time to repair (MTTR) is of particular interest to the 
reliability team, because unlike other forms of downtime, 
these values can be quantitatively predicted and analyzed in 
the design phase. This paper will discuss how allocations 
were initially created and then adjusted as GSDO evolved 
through its design life cycle. 
2. GSDO LAUNCH AVAILABILITY  
GSDO subsystems along with the SLS and Orion programs 
have been allocated a Launch Probability Technical 
Performance Measure (TPM) to ensure the success of future 
missions. This TPM required an integrated effort between the 
programs and was calculated using Discrete Event 
Simulation (DES) modeling. The cross-program team 
developed a DES model to determine the probability of 
launch after the start of the countdown window. These results 
were then in turn allocated down to each of the programs [1]. 
Currently, the objective launch probability of the overall 
architecture is to be no less than 90% for each launch attempt. 
In order to assess the capability of the architecture, a DES 
model utilizing historical data and current operational 
definitions provided input parameters to the launch 
probability allocations for each program. The GSDO DES 
team tracks and quantifies launch probability risk due to 
ground system delays, human error, scheduling conflicts with 
other customers, and weather.  
 
For the GSDO reliability team, the launch probability 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20160003131 2019-08-31T04:09:37+00:00Z
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allocation was decomposed to two requirements, Inherent 
Launch Availability and Operational Availability. As shown 
in Figures 1 and 2, these allocations were further decomposed 
to reliability and maintainability requirements for the GSDO 
subsystems. 
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Figure 1 – GSDO Launch Probability & Availability  
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Figure 2 - GSDO RMA Subsystem Allocations 
Inherent Launch Availability is defined as all the subsystems 
that are required to support and actualize a successful launch. 
The availability requirement states that GSDO will have an 
inherent launch availability of at least 98% within the 
timeframe of 24 hours prior to the launch attempt. 
Operational Availability is defined as all the subsystems that 
are required to repair and support systems after a launch scrub 
is called which could require a launch vehicle roll back 
scenario to the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB).  The 
operational availability requirement states that GSDO will 
have an operational availability of at least 80% with a 
timeframe of 360 hours, beginning with the start of the first 
launch attempt plus 14 days prior to the next launch attempt. 
This definition of operational availability contrasts with the 
definition found in the literature, which includes forms of 
downtime associated with all maintenance tasks. The 
inherent launch availability requirement has not changed 
while the operational availability requirement has been 
updated since the RMA effort began [2]-[3]. The 
methodology used to achieve these requirements has been 
updated to reflect the current status of subsystem designs. 
3. ALLOCATIONS 
The allocation methodology employed included previously 
used historical data from prior programs and subsystem 
subject-matter expertise in combination with common 
reliability allocation techniques to ensure conformance with 
launch probability and availability requirements. As systems 
progressed through their design life cycle and more data 
became available with the supplier hardware, it became 
necessary to reexamine the previously derived allocations. 
Allocating is an iterative process; as systems moved beyond 
the conceptual and preliminary design phases there was an 
opportunity for the reliability engineering team to reevaluate 
allocations based on updated designs and maintainability 
characteristics of components.  
One factor for reallocating requirements was the number of 
systems under analysis. Previous research [2] included 42 
subsystems under analysis for Inherent Launch Availability 
and 12 subsystems for Operational Availability; these 
numbers have been updated to 37 subsystems for Inherent 
Launch Availability and 14 for Operational Availability. As 
subsystem designs progressed, it was determined that some 
subsystem’s components were absorbed by other subsystems 
and others were found to be essential to Operational 
Availability rather than Inherent Launch Availability. 
Another factor was the increase in hardware as subsystem’s 
reached their final design reviews. The original allocations 
were based on preliminary designs and did not account for 
additional components and changes to the launch architecture 
(e.g. flight vehicle, ground systems). As the program 
approached its critical design milestone, eighteen subsystems 
were not meeting their requirements. This high number led 
the team to consider whether the initial requirement was 
incorrect or whether reallocations were necessary. It is 
recommended in practice that any design changes, including 
modifications to the system architecture, warrant reallocation 
of requirements. However, there is a lack of case studies in 
the literature verifying this suggestion. During reallocation, 
trade-offs between reliability and maintainability were 
essential to ensuring the integrity of RMA analyses. For 
example, four recommended techniques for allocating 
maintainability did not apply to GSDO subsystems [4]; these 
methods are recommended early in the design phase and do 
not reflect the current status of GSDO system designs which 
vary in complexity and operation.  
4. METHODOLOGY 
Software 
The GSDO RMA team uses the PTC’s Windchill Quality 
Solutions (WQS) (formerly Relex) software tool for analysis. 
WQS is a reliability analysis tool that uses common standards 
for reliability prediction, contains databases of failure data for 
mechanical, electrical, and electromechanical assemblies, 
and uses numerical methods to provide results for RMA 
analyses. The RMA team uses two of WQS’s modules for 
analysis: Reliability Prediction and Reliability Block 
Diagrams (RBD).  
The user can create parts lists in the Reliability Prediction 
module for all components in the subsystem under analysis 
either by entering user-defined data or using the software’s 
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prediction libraries. This module assigns failure rates to each 
part using various methods. WQS uses MIL-HDBK-217F 
parts count methodology to assign failure rates. The software 
does have the capability to use newer methods such 217Plus, 
which requires several pieces of additional information, such 
as operating temperature and other environmental factors. 
This data is difficult to collect for all subsystems during the 
design phase but can be collected during the testing and 
validation phases. To maintain consistency between the 
analyses MIL-HDBK-217F is used for calculations.  
 
The RMA team enters user-defined data when manufacturer 
failure rate or MTBF are published; also when available, 
historical failure rates can be entered in to the component list. 
The Non-electronic Parts Reliability Database (NPRD), 
Electronic Parts Reliability Database (EPRD), and other 
ancillary handbooks are used for RMA analysis. The NPRD 
and EPRD libraries use field failure rate data; these libraries 
are also incorporated into the software used for analysis, 
when manufacturer or historical data is not available. These 
capabilities allow the RMA team to develop a complete parts 
library for the subsystem under study from a variety of 
reputable sources. 
 
The primary modeling tool for analysis is the RBD. The 
configuration of the components within the RBD reflects the 
functionality of the subsystem and accounts for redundancy 
and backup systems. For subsystems that have built in 
redundancy in to their design, an RBD can also demonstrate 
the logical connection between components. Generally, the 
larger and more complex a subsystem design is the larger the 
RBD model will be. An RBD does not represent the physical 
location or configuration of components; only components 
that are required to function for the successful performance 
of a subsystem are included. All results of RMA analyses are 
derived from the WQS’s RBD module.  
 
RBDs can be modeled in multiple layers of single and parallel 
configurations. RBDs can also be modeled in multiple 
configurations: series, parallel, or series-parallel. At the 
subsystem level, the RBD models are a combination of these 
options. At the top level, all systems are mutually 
independent of one another and are modeled serially. For the 
Inherent Launch Availability requirement, failure of any of 
the 37 subsystems will result in a launch scrub scenario. 
 
A sensitivity analysis is performed using Monte-Carlo 
probabilistic simulation for reliability and availability 
calculations. The Monte-Carlo technique uses a selection of 
random numbers during the simulation process of 1,000,000 
iterations. This approach confirms the consistency and 
accuracy of the results. A confidence interval of 95% is 
selected for analysis.  
There are limitations to any software analysis tool. Within the 
capability of WQS, and in order to maintain consistency 
across all analyses, all calculations were made assuming 
exponential distribution for failure and repair data.  
Reliability Allocations 
The concise definition for reliability is the probability that 
an item (e.g. subsystem, component) will perform its 
intended function with no failures during a given period of 
time under specified operation conditions. Reliability is 
expressed, in equation (1), as the probability that a system 
(or component) will fail at or after a predetermined time 𝑡,  
 
𝑅(𝑡) = Pr⁡{𝑇 ≥ 𝑡}                               (1) 
In general, failures that occur randomly or by chance events 
are modelled by the exponential distribution. This 
distribution is also known as the Constant Failure Rate 
model, meaning components fail at a constant rate 
independent of component design, operating time, and age. 
For reusable launch systems, like those being analyzed 
independent analyses of historical data have determined that 
failure data can follow the exponential distribution [5]. The 
reliability equation, as expressed in (2), for the exponential 
distribution is 
 
𝑅(𝑡) = ⁡ 𝑒−𝜆𝑡                                   (2)                                                                                    
where 𝜆 is the subsystem or component failure rate and 𝑡 is 
the mission time. Failure rate is also expressed, in equation 
(3), as the reciprocal of the Mean Time Between Failures 
(MTBF). MTBF represents the average time an item is 
operational between failures. 
 
𝜆 = ⁡
1
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
                                       (3)                                                                                       
In order to accurately model subsystems, components are 
chosen that most closely resemble parts found in the 
subsystem under study. For RMA analysis, failure rate data 
(λ or MTBF) is supplied by the manufacturer, through 
prediction part libraries, ancillary handbooks, or historical 
data from previous programs. Prediction part libraries are 
depositories of parts and assemblies failure rates collected 
from multiple sources.  
 
The measures for reliability and availability are commonly 
expressed in terms of 9s. For example, the values of 
reliability allocations that subsystems are required to meet 
range from two-9s (0.99) to over three-9s (0.999), meaning 
they are expected to be 99% or 99.9% reliable.  When 
modeled serially, the product of all subsystem reliabilities, 
expressed in equation (4), will determine the reliability of 
GSDO subsystems.    
𝑅𝐺𝑆𝐷𝑂 = ∏ 𝑅𝑖(𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝑅1 ∗ 𝑅2 ∗ …∗ 𝑅𝑛           (4) 
Maintainability Allocations 
Maintainability is a design parameter which describes the 
ability of a subsystem to be restored or repaired to an 
operational state within a given time period. Maintenance is 
the action to restore or repair a system to an operational state. 
Maintainability is expressed, in equation (5), as the 
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probability that a system (or component) can be repaired at 
or before a predetermined time 𝑡, 
𝑀(𝑡) = Pr⁡{𝑇 ≤ 𝑡}                          (5) 
The inclusion of maintainability in subsystem design can 
reduce system downtime by decreasing the Mean Time to 
Repair (MTTR). There are four subsets to system downtime: 
corrective maintenance, preventative maintenance, 
administrative delay time, and logistics delay time. The RMA 
analysis at this time only includes corrective maintenance 
time. It is a challenge and not a recommended practice to 
predict estimates for preventative maintenance and delay 
times; the greatest variability in time exists during these 
actions. A general corrective maintenance cycle can included 
many phases from when the failure occurs to when the repair 
is completed. The phases of corrective maintenance under 
analysis included: fault detection, localization and isolation, 
disassembly, repair or replacement, reassembly, and 
functional checkout [6]. Corrective maintenance or MTTR, is 
the unscheduled maintenance tasks to restore a system to an 
operational state as a result of system failure. For GSDO, the 
RMA team is concerned with the time frame between 
disassembly and functional checkout, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – Corrective Maintenance Cycle 
Many of the GSDO subsystems contain legacy hardware and 
the numerous upgrades to subsystems are similar in 
accessibility and maintainability compared to their 
predecessors. Therefore, there is a strong case for 
quantitatively predicting correct maintenance for subsystem 
components. These factors combined with subject matter 
expertise from operations engineers involved with subsystem 
upgrades and available historical data from repair reports 
provided the RMA team with conservative, yet realistic 
estimates for MTTR. The RMA team initially uses their best 
engineering judgment for MTTR estimates based on a 3-shift, 
24 hour operation for launch activities. For example, the 
initial estimate for a faulty solenoid valve which is to be 
removed and replaced, would be 8 hours (1 shift). This 
estimate would then be submitted to the subsystem operations 
and design engineers for verification. Adjustments were 
made based on subject matter expertise input.  
Maintainability is the counterpart of reliability, both are 
contributors to a subsystem’s availability. The goal of 
maintainability is to reduce lifecycle costs by mitigating a 
“design it now and fix it later” conflict. Historically, repair 
times have been modelled using the lognormal distribution. 
For reusable launch ground systems, like those being 
analyzed, independent analyses of historical data have 
determined that repair times can follow either a lognormal or 
exponential distribution [5]. For subsystem analyses, 
software limitations only allow for an exponential 
distribution for repair data. 
Assuming constant repair rates (or exponential distribution) 
for subsystem components, the probability of completing a 
repair in time t or less can be determined. The maintainability 
function, in equation (6), for an exponential distribution of 
repair times is  
M(t) = 1 − 𝑒−μt                                 (6) 
where⁡𝜇 is the constant repair rate and 𝑡 is the allocated time 
to repair for the subsystem. The constant repair rate is also 
expressed as the reciprocal of MTTR as expressed in equation 
(7), 
𝜇 = ⁡
1
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
                                         (7) 
The maintainability function determines the probability of 
completing a repair within a specified time In general, a 
maintainability allocation has an MTTR for each subsystem 
using one of these recommended methods: failure rate 
complexity allocation, equal allocation, and statistically-
based calculated allocation [4]. The equal allocation method 
could not be used for GSDO; this method assumes that an 
MTTR allocation is independent of a subsystems failure rate 
and can be distributed equally among the subsystems. This is 
not feasible because GSDO subsystems vary in complexity 
such as ease of access, type of repairable components, and 
type of subsystem. For example, some GSDO subsystems are 
strictly electrical subsystems, while others are a combination 
of electrical, mechanical and electromechanical subsystems. 
The statistically based allocation method is not applicable 
either; this method assumes a lognormal distributions for 
repair times. The failure rate complexity method, while 
practical, assumes that subsystems with the lowest reliability 
will be assigned the lowest MTTR values. In reality, a 
complex system of systems will include a variation of low 
and high reliability systems with a variety of component and 
aggregate subsystem MTTRs.  
For GSDO, it would have been impractical to assign MTTR 
values using one of these methods. Therefore, MTTR values 
were assigned based on type of system, ease of access, and 
the weighted failure rate of components. An internal analysis 
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of historical ground system delay times determined that the 
MTTR for ground systems is about 50 hours. Using this 
estimate as a guide and with subject matter expertise input, 
subsystems which contained a majority of mechanical or 
electro-mechanical hardware were assigned higher MTTR 
values than electrical subsystems. Mechanical subsystems 
were allocated a maximum MTTR of 30 hours. Electrical 
subsystems which contained quick remove and replace 
hardware were allocated the lowest MTTR values, between 
15 and 20 hours. To calculate the total mean corrective 
maintenance time for a subsystem (𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆), the MTTR for 
each component is weighted against the individual 
component’s failure rate. The mean corrective maintenance 
time is expressed in equation (8) as  
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆 =⁡
𝛴(𝜆𝑖∙𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑖)
𝛴𝜆𝑖
                           (8) 
where the 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆 is calculated using each 𝑖th component 
failure and repair data. This approach is also used to 
determine the MTTR for all GSDO subsystems, as expressed 
in equation (9), 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑆𝐷𝑂 =⁡
𝛴(𝜆𝑆𝑆∙𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑆𝑆)
𝛴𝜆𝑆𝑆
                       (9) 
The MTTR for a subsystem or component represents the 
average number of hours for a component or subsystem to be 
restored to an operational state after an unexpected failure.   
Availability Allocations 
Availability, which is a function of reliability and 
maintainability, is the probability that a repairable subsystem 
will operate satisfactorily at a given point in time during the 
period of analysis (estimated to be 24 or 360 hours). There 
are many ways of expressing availability, whether inherent or 
operational. It is the goal of the RMA team to produce 
relevant and best estimates for how subsystems will operate 
at the critical point during launch countdown (i.e., at the time 
of launch or T-0). Inherent Availability is the probability that 
a system will perform satisfactorily at any given time under 
specific operating conditions in an ideal support 
environment. Typically, Steady-State Inherent Availability is 
expressed in equation (10) as 
𝐴 = ⁡
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹
𝑀𝑇𝐵𝐹+𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅
=
𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒+𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒
               (10) 
where uptime and downtime are considered the basic 
statistics for assessing a system’s performance. For GSDO, 
the performance specification is measured at 24 or 360 hours. 
Therefore, in order to assess a subsystem’s design, the point 
(or instantaneous) availability is used. When both the failure 
distribution and the repair distribution are based on the 
exponential distribution, point availability is expressed in 
equation (11) as 
⁡𝐴(𝑡) = ⁡
𝜇
𝜆+𝜇
+
𝜆
𝜆+𝜇
𝑒−(𝜆+𝜇)𝑡                     (11) 
where μ is the subsystem’s repair rate, λ is the subsystem’s 
failure rate and t is the specified mission time or point in time 
for the subsystem to be available. As with reliability, when 
modelled serially, the product of all subsystem availabilities, 
as expressed in equation (12), will determine the availability 
of GSDO subsystems.     
𝐴𝐺𝑆𝐷𝑂 = ∏ 𝐴𝑖(𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 𝐴1 ∗ 𝐴2 ∗ … ∗ 𝐴𝑛          (12) 
Using equation (12), will also verify the Inherent Launch 
Availability and Operational Availability requirements.   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
As NASA design reference missions are further developed, a 
robust ground systems architecture is needed. The RMA team 
analyzes GSDO subsystems to quantitatively determine if 
subsystems will meet the Inherent Launch Availability and 
Operational Availability requirements. These requirements 
exist to ensure that ground systems are safe, reliable, 
maintainable, and available to successfully support launch 
activities. The team provides recommendations to design 
teams with the intent to ensure that the design meets program 
level requirements. The RMA analysis is intended to verify 
that upgrades in design, in combination with legacy systems, 
meet the RMA allocations. If a subsystem is unable to meet 
its allocations, the RMA team will consult with the design 
team’s engineers to determine if a design change is feasible 
or a suitable operational workaround exists. When multiple 
subsystems were not meeting their requirements, an 
opportunity existed to determine whether the requirement 
was incorrect or reallocation was necessary. The RMA team 
determined that significant increases in the number of 
components and changes to the launch architecture since the 
effort began required the team to reassess the allocations.  
As stated in the beginning of this paper, it is recommended in 
practice that any design changes including modifications to 
the system architecture warrant reallocation of requirements. 
After reassessing GSDO subsystems, the following 
recommendations are offered: 
 Any increase in the number of components without 
a change in the design strategy (e.g. quality of 
hardware, redundancy) will result in a change in 
the calculated measures for reliability and 
maintainability. This will affect the calculated 
availability; therefore, reallocation should be 
considered.  
 Using hardware that historically has higher failure 
rates and are considered single points of failure 
(e.g. valves, transducers) will have an impact on 
the estimated reliability of the subsystem. 
 Significant changes to the system architecture, 
such as the addition or removal of subsystems will 
affect the overall calculated availability 
requirement; therefore, reallocation should be 
considered 
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6. FORWARD WORK 
In order to verify and validate the GSDO requirements it is 
essential that the RMA team continues to be involved in the 
testing and integration activities leading up to system 
certification. Developing an analysis set that includes all 
forms of downtime – logistics, administrative, preventative, 
and conditional-based maintenance should be completed 
during system testing to ensure verification. These results can 
be compared to the requirements; recommending further 
improvements if necessary. As more data becomes available, 
these estimates can be used to further refine the number of 
maintenance personnel required to complete a repair. Proper 
training of personnel and optimizing spares inventory using 
top-rated contributors to unavailability of subsystems will 
keep repair times to a minimum. The RMA team will be an 
integral part of certifying ground systems to support launch.  
As GSDO moves forward to operations and sustainment, 
RMA can use collected data from testing and verification to 
provide trending data, reliability growth opportunities, and 
implement a reliability-centered maintenance approach to 
sustaining long term performance of ground systems.  
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